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INTRODUCTION
Some men think that the earth is round, others think it flat;
it is a matter capable of question. But if it is flat, will the
King's command make it round? And if it is round, will the
King's command flatten it?'
These are the words of Thomas More as interpreted by Rob-
ert Bolt in his play A Man for All Seasons. More invokes the issue
of scientific truth to question Parliament's authority to deter-
mine whether King Henry VIII should be recognized as the
head of the Church of England. The point is well taken. When
the issue is scientific truth, those with lawmaking authority can-
not decide. Yet More's insight is not limited to empirical truths
about the natural world. Philosophical truths are also beyond
the competence of the legislature. There is something ridiculous
* Cardozo Professor ofJuisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 133 (1990).
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about a legislature intermeddling in a philosophical dispute -
say, by deciding whether Immanuel Kant's moral theory is supe-
rior to Jeremy Bentham's. The point is so obvious that one
wonders how any legislature could think differently. Yet some
do. Some codes legislate the basic philosophical concepts on
which they depend. Others function in a more subtle collabora-
tion with the creative output of scholars and courts.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTHS AND LEGISLATURES
American legislatures invade the domain of philosophical
truth on a regular basis. The Model Penal Code ("MPC"), orig-
inally drafted by the American Law Institute in 1962, offers itself
as a stellar example. The MPC ventures numerous definitions on
matters that nevertheless remain open to philosophical dispute.
For example, section 2.01(2) of the MPC defines a voluntary
act by excluding any "bodily movement that .. . is not a prod-
uct of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious
or habitual."3 By implicitly defining action as a product of the
will, the code takes a stand on a highly controversial philosophi-
cal issue, one that generated heated debate among German
scholars for several decades after World War II. Perhaps without
realizing it, the MPC's drafters committed themselves to a causal
as opposed to a teleological theory of action.' The teleological
theory holds that action must be defined relative to the actor's
intentionality;5 the causal theory insists that willed bodily move-
ments are sufficient to constitute action.6
What was the great utility of tackling this philosophical conun-
drum? In those cases where the issue might arise, say, whether
sleepwalking was or was not a voluntary act, the courts have no
trouble consulting the case law or the scholarly literature on the
subject. Even with the MPC's definition, case law and scholarly
MODEL PENAL CODE (1985).
See id. § 2.01(2) (d).
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 435-39 (1978) (explaining dif-
ference between causal and teleological theories of action).
5 See id. at 439-48.
6 See id. at 433-35. See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY
OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw (1993) (providing current example
and defending view that "willed bodily movements" are sufficient for action).
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literature remain indispensable - the terms of the code's defi-
nition require interpretation and elaboration. The point is that
the question "What is a voluntary act?" is a philosophical ques-
tion for which there is a truth of the matter - one's view
might be true or false. Thus, legislatures exceed their compe-
tence when they try to resolve such issues.
Causation is no less troublesome a philosophical problem
than that of voluntary acts. We seek the best account of causa-
tion on the assumption that some accounts are closer to the
truth than others. One wonders, then, whether the MPC's defi-
nition of causation is of any real use:
Conduct is the cause of a result when:
(a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question
would not have occurred; and
(b) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies
any additional causal requirements imposed by the Code
or by the law defining the offense.7
This provision, of course, does not tell you much because the
problems of proximate cause are deferred to other code provi-
sions.' While the remaining subdivisions of section 2.03 provide
more detailed solutions for the problem of remote damage in
cases pitched to particular modes of culpability, all of the stipu-
lations end with the proviso that the defendant should be crimi-
nally liable for remote harm only if the harm is not too remote
"to have a Uust] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity
of his offense."9 Including the word "just," however, leaves all
the difficult problems unresolved; therefore, the attempted ver-
bal compassing of the concept turns out to be words with little
constraining effect. The philosophical problem of causation
turns out not to be easily disciplined. Thus, legislators enter
these minefields at their peril.
The hazard of legislating philosophical truths is again illustrat-
ed in the problem of distinguishing intentional from negligent
wrongdoing. This is a matter that legal theorists have pondered
for centuries. Characteristically, the MPC's drafters thought they
had it all resolved. Indeed, many scholars concur that section
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1).
See, e.g., id. § 2.03(3).
See id. § 2.03(2) (b) (alteration in original).
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2.02(2) - defining the four mental states of purpose, knowl-
edge, recklessness, and negligence - is one of the achievements
of the MPC worthy of celebration. ° In fact, however, the dis-
tinction between purposely and knowingly causing harm is hard
to master. Lawyers and judges have grasped the distinctions only
with great difficulty. Though the structuring of recklessness and
negligence has much to commend it, they also are probably too
convoluted for busy practicing lawyers. Even if these definitions
could be easily committed to memory, however, my objection is
still worth repeating: Are these matters really within the province
of legislative wisdom and authority? After all, is the MPC's dis-
tinction between intentional and negligent conduct subject to
being found true or false? Is there a truth of the matter? If
there is, then the search for the truth is appropriately left to the
tentative explorations of scholars and judges.
Consider one final instance of the MPC's drive to reduce
enduring philosophical problems to black letter rules: the ap-
proach to unlawful force in section 3.11(1). The term "unlawful
force" proves to be pivotal in a number of provisions on the
justified use of force. In particular, self-defense requires that the
actor reasonably believe that the use of force is immediately
necessary to counter the use of unlawful force."
As the concept is used in the continental legal traditions,
unlawful force describes the unjustified, though possibly excused,
use of force."5 To make sense of this definition one needs to
understand the concepts of justification and excuse. Yet these
are not concepts that can be effectively reduced to black letter
rules. Once explained, however, the concepts are fairly easy to
grasp and apply.
Compare the simplicity of this continental approach with the
prolix outpouring of words in section 3.11(1) of the MPC:
(1) "unlawful force" means force, including confinement,
that is employed without the consent of the person
against whom it is directed and the employment of
which constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would
,0 See id. § 2.02(2).
See id. § 3.04(1).
SeeJoshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and
the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 708-09 (1988) (discussing concepts of unlawful
force and justifiable force in terms of duress).
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constitute such offense or tort except for a defense
(such as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental
capacity; duress; youth; or diplomatic status) not
amounting to a privilege to use the force. Assent consti-
tutes consent, within the meaning of this Section,
whether or not it otherwise is legally effective, except
assent to the infliction of death or serious bodily inju-
ry.
13
The fact is that this convoluted section says exactly the same
thing as, for instance, the German formula - unlawful force is
unjustified but possibly excused force. The only difference is
that the continental tradition relies heavily on the work of schol-
ars whereas, in the late 1950s, the MPC's drafters could not call
upon a comparable body of theoretical literature in English that
would have explained these elementary points to them. Further-
more, the idea of looking abroad for guidance presumably
would have been an insult to the assumed wisdom of the draft-
ing committee.
Comparative law has the great advantage of enabling us to
realize that things might be different. There might be an ap-
proach to codification that differs from the MPC. Indeed, my
thoughts about the definitional presumptuousness of the MPC
are nourished by the 1975 German Criminal Code."4 The Ger-
man statute makes no comparable effort to define any of these
basic building blocks of criminal liability - action, causation,
intention, negligence, justification, or excuse - although each
plays a similar role in deciding criminal liability. For instance,
German criminal liability presupposes and requires a voluntary
action just as American law does.' But the German Code draft-
ers saw no need for a definition on a matter so obviously sub-
ject to philosophical controversy, just as they did not see a point
in addressing the concepts of causation, intention, and negli-
gence. Similarly, the concepts of justification and excuse are
indispensable for working with the Code, but the Code makes
no effort to capture the concepts in lapidary legislative language.
SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(1).
See generally STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] (F.R.G.).
15 See Heribert Schumann, Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 383, 388
(Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996) (explaining that German Civil Law pre-
sumes offender acts voluntarily in committing crime).
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Thus, while the German Code relies on all these foundational
concepts, the text offers no definition of them.
Why, then, might the MPC venture where the German draft-
ers are loathe to tread? The simple explanation is that the
American approach to code drafting proceeds on the assump-
tion that the code must stand on its own. American codes are
not embedded in a theoretical literature that elaborates the
essential concepts necessary for working with the code. A code
of this sort is "imperialistic" - it seeks to displace not only the
encrustation of the case law but also the teachings of scholars.
Imperialistic codes propose to be comprehensive guides to the
solution of particular problems. Of course, the courts must still
apply the codes and resolve the interstitial problems of their
provisions. The point is, however, that under such imperialistic
codes, scholars are left only with the residual task of writing
commentary on the codes and case law.
By contrast, a "deferential" code is less ambitious. It endorses
a theoretical structure for solving problems and may contain
some detailed provisions on specific areas, but it proceeds on
the assumption of partnership with both the courts and the
theoretical community.16 A deferential code, therefore, has a
proper sense of its own limits. To be sure, it avoids trying to
solve controverted philosophical issues.
To illustrate, the German Criminal Code is a deferential code,
as is the Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch ("BGB"), 7 the German Civil
Code. The approach to private transactions in the BGB is based
on the concept of the willenserkiirung - the declaration of the
will. i" The concept is as critical as that of voluntary acts in the
field of criminal law, yet the BGB sees no need to define one of
its most basic concepts. That task is left to the scholarly litera-
ture.'
9
6 See Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2205 (1991) (stating
that in Europe courts and academics work together to develop law).
" See StGB (F.R.G.); BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] (F.R.G.); see also Joachim
Zekoll, Kant and Comparative Law - Some Reflections on a Reform Effort, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2719,
2745-46 (1996) (discussing permissive nature of German law).
" See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1889, 2091 (1995) (discussing how drafters of BGB believed "declaration of
will" to be sole basis for contract).




The U.S. Constitution is a good example of the deferential
style because it leaves its key concepts for elaboration by case
law. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment is implicitly limit-
ed to action by the states, but the Constitution offers no defini-
tion of state action.' The sparse words of the Bill of Rights,
including the provisions of free speech, freedom of religion, and
search and seizure, require conceptual structures for their elabo-
ration. The student of American constitutional law may find
these structures partly in the case law.2 Without recourse to
the leading articles and scholarly books in the field, however,
the student would be hard pressed to formulate a comprehen-
sive view of free speech, freedom of religion, equal protection
law, search and seizure, or, indeed, any field of constitutional
law anchored in the country's original charter.
These examples suffice to make the general point that some
codes seek to legislate the basic philosophical concepts on which
they depend while others function in a subtle collaboration with
the creative output of scholars and courts. Arguably, the point
that legislatures should refrain from meddling in the area of
philosophical truths lends itself to the reductio ad absurdum:
every provision in a code is potentially a matter of truth; there-
fore, if legislatures abstained from legislating in such areas of
philosophical controversy, they would not legislate at all. After
all, is there not a philosophical truth about the meaning of
theft, the role of negligence in tort law, or the criteria for form-
ing a valid contract? Some people indeed think there might be,
yet these are matters on which legislative competence is general-
ly assumed.
We need, therefore, to account for the shared assumption
that legislative will may indeed bind courts in certain areas of
human interaction. I suggest that we divide the world of possible
legislation into three categories. First, legislative acts may con-
cern matters of philosophical truth on which legislatures should
defer to the work of theorists and the tentative judgments of the
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (illustrating how Constitution contains no defini-
tion for 'state action").
2 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-28 (1991) (elaborating on search and
seizure doctrine); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777-80 (1986)
(elaborating on freedom of speech doctrine); Follett v. Town of McCormick, SC, 321 U.S.
573, 577 (1944) (expanding on definition of freedom of religion).
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courts. Typical examples are those discussed in this Article: vol-
untary acts and causation. Second, legislation may regard matters
on which there is no truth of the matter, the point of legisla-
tion being to coordinate behavior and, thus, avoid needless
conflict. Typical examples are rules of the road and rules of civil
and criminal procedure. In this area it is far more important to
get the matter settled than to get it right. Finally, legislative acts
may fall into the vast middle area between the first two catego-
ries where the very question whether there is a philosophical
truth of the matter is open to dispute.
To illustrate, consider the definitions of larceny and embezzle-
ment. The criminal law does not seek to penalize all possible
instances of dishonest acquisition. Rather, the crime of larceny is
limited, in most codified definitions, to taking and carrying away
specific objects with the intent to permanently deprive the own-
er of the use of the object.22 The dishonest use of electricity or
the dishonest capture of electronic signals might be just as bad
as surreptitiously taking a concrete object, but the acquisition of
intangibles is generally not regarded as satisfying the standard
legislative definition of theft. The point of defining larceny is
not, therefore, to discover and express the truth, but to establish
a rule for guiding our behavior.
The purpose of the special part of the criminal code, then, is
not to teach people the difference between right and wrong as
a philosophical inquiry might endeavor, but to simply advise
citizens about the liability risks implicit in their conduct. In fact,
the nearly universal principle of modern criminal justice, nuUa
poena sine lege (no punishment without prior legislative warning),
requires that a democratically elected legislature specify the
contours of liability.2" Thus, regardless of the question of truth,
legislatures have the competence and indeed the duty to lay
down the rules defining particular offenses. Citizens need to
know what is prohibited in the special part of the code in order
to avoid the risk of liability.
See 10 U.S.C. § 921 (1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (McKinney 1997).
23 See GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 575-76 (2d. ed. 1961)
(requiring fixed, predetermined law to have crime or punishment); Jermoe Hall, Nulla
Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1937) (noting maxim nulla poena sine lege requires
strict construction of penal statutes that are not given retroactive effect).
[Vol. 31:745
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In contrast, citizens need not ponder the mysteries of action,
causation, and the subtle differences between purposeful, know-
ing, and reckless conduct. Many of the issues of the general part
are philosophical conundrums that are irrelevant to citizens'
planning of liability-free conduct. Thus, the role of legislation in
the general part of the criminal law is more subtle and compli-
cated.
The primary purpose of legislation in the general part of a
criminal code is distinguished from the purpose of the special
part in that it may not be to guide citizens, but rather to gener-
ate consistency in judging. The audience may be primarily judg-
es rather than citizens. Definitions of excusing conditions, such
as duress, insanity, and mistakes of law, are needed not so much
to advise citizens about how to avoid liability for harmful con-
duct, but rather to channel the decisions of the judges into
predictable patterns. These are the rules that Meir Dan-Cohen
describes as decision rules for judges rather than conduct rules
addressed to citizens.24 However, it would be difficult to say this
is the exclusive function served by the norms of the general
part. For example, norms about the justifiable use of deadly
force, also in the general part, serve to advise citizens about
when and under what circumstances they can shoot to kill.
These are but a few suggested guidelines to the problem of
addressing philosophical truth in legislation. There is obviously
more reflection required, particularly in the private law fields of
contracts and torts, about when it is appropriate to legislate and
when it is necessary to defer to reflective wisdom of the academ-
ic profession. About one thing, however, I am sure: the question
whether a matter is properly reserved to philosophical reflection
is itself a matter capable of conceptual analysis that can be true
or false. The legislature cannot determine, as a matter of will, its
own jurisdiction over the range of ideas that represent claims of
philosophical truth. Not even the King's command that the
earth is flat will change its globular nature.
'4 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
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II. DIADIC AND TRIADIc LEGAL THINKING
That certain issues should be reserved to the reflective think-
ing of the theoretical community enables us to understand one
of the fundamental cleavages between common-law and conti-
nental civil-law systems. In common-law systems, the official
sources of law are often limited to statutes and judicial prece-
dents - statutes establish the general norms, and cases work
out the details. I shall refer to this mode of thinking about law
as diadic, wherein two poles, statutes and cases, determine what
the law is.
Today, it would be hard to find a developed monadic legal
system that relied either exclusively on statutes or on the prece-
dents of the case law. In fact, virtually all Western legal systems
today are at least diadic. In addition to legislative promulgations,
case law - jurisprudence constante - has become an indispens-
able part of understanding the terrain of any particular field of
law.
The distinctive feature of continental civil-law systems is that
they have historically relied upon the contribution of scholarly
teachings and doctrine in the evolution and definition of the
law. This third dimension renders these continental systems
triadic. In triadic systems, statutes and case law must accommo-
date the interpretation and theories offered in the scholarly
literature.' Of course, no single scholar shapes the law the way
the United States Supreme Court or Congress rules from on
high. Scholarly opinion on conceptual and philosophical matters
becomes influential only when it finds support in the communi-
ty of scholars or when it becomes, as the Germans say, die
herrschende Lehre (the dominant teaching).
Understandably, codes in triadic legal cultures are deferential.
They respect the role of scholarly teachings in shaping the law.
In diadic legal cultures, by contrast, codes are imperialistic -
the drafters see no reason to defer to the supposed philosophi-
cal wisdom of scholars. Imperialistic codemakers think they are
just as capable as anyone else to decide what is a voluntary act,
25 See MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH




when one event causes another, or what the nature of
intentionality is. It is worth noting, however, that in the modern
world, legal cultures are no longer entirely diadic or triadic.26
At the same time that case law becomes ever more important in
continental jurisdictions, common-law courts increasingly defer
to scholarly authorities.
Even though the U.S. Constitution provides an example of a
deferential code, with theoretical scholarship playing a major
role in the development of the law, common-law lawyers still
tend to brand scholarly writing as secondary authority. It is hard
for English speaking lawyers to think of the input of learned
writers as primary authority for moving the law forward or, in-
deed, for preserving traditional values under-appreciated at the
moment.
Thus, the challenge for lawyers in the common-law tradition is
to understand the nature of triadic legal thinking under defer-
ential codes. To better understand triadic legal cultures, it helps
to grasp the humanistic nature of law. From this perspective,
legal studies consist primarily of elaborating meanings and values
that further the aims of a just legal order. Conceived of in this
way, the law is more akin to theology and philosophy than it is
to the social sciences. Though it makes sense for the reflective
wisdom of respected scholars to play a major role in the shaping
of the law, we have trouble finding the right words in English to
capture this humanistic dimension of scholarship. The terms
"doctrine" and "dogma," though respectable in theological cir-
cles, carry excessively authoritarian connotations. It is better to
use the all-purpose term "theory" to capture the third dimension
of the law.
The function of theoretical work in law is to prove the basic
concepts that bear on legal analysis, order these concepts in
some kind of structure, and elaborate the values and principles
that lie behind the structure of liability. Philosophical reflections
on the nature of action, declarations of the will, fault, reliance,
causation, wrongdoing, excuses, and responsibility all fall within
the bailiwick of theory in criminal and private law. As lawyers in
triadic legal cultures understand the concept of law, the best
theoretical teachings become constitutive elements of the law."
There are triadic arenas of American law, however, such as constitutional law.
See George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 984-87 (1981)
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When they are suitably drafted, deferential codes invariably
invite triadic thinking. A body of theory underlies the code and
informs its style of drafting. For students, the critical feature of
a deferential code is the necessity of mastering the whole before
addressing the parts. You cannot understand or work with the
provisions of the BGB or the 1975 German Criminal Code with-
out first understanding the system of thought that implicitly
provides the foundation for the code. For instance, the German
tripartite structure on unlawful force - definition, unlawfulness,
and culpability - represents a claim about the way things are
and about the inherent structure of criminal liability. This is not
simply a matter of opinion for how best to organize our think-
ing about criminal liability. It is rather a claim about the world,
much as a scientific claim about the structure of atoms is an
assertion of truth about a physical phenomenon. That which is
not expressed in deferential codes, and which resides in the
theoretical infrastructure, might even be more relevant than that
which is actually laid down in black letter rules.
The structure of a deferential code is typically revealed in its
general part, which contains the provisions applicable across the
fields of obligations, property, family law, and inheritance. The
principles of the general part typically rely on undefined con-
cepts, much as the BGB relies on the concept of "declaration of
will" as the unifying principle of private law.2 Significantly, the
1804 French Civil Code' lacks a general part, which reveals the
relatively early date of its adoption and suggests a lower stage of
evolution in the art of codification.
In contrast to codes, constitutions seem never to contain a
formal general part. It is clear, however, that certain provisions
come to stand out and confer a structure on the rest of the
document. In the case of the U.S. Constitution, the Due Process
Clauses,' the Necessary and Proper Clause,"' and the primacy
of the first ten amendments" all provide a unifying structure to
(discussing effect of legal theory on law).
' See Ewald, supra note 18, at 2091 (discussing how drafters of BGB believed "declara-
tion of will" to be basis for contract law).
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] (1804) (Fr.).
'o U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
I' /d. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
I /d. amends. I-X.
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the entire document. In the case of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, the unifying structure inheres in the first
section, which establishes the following order of constitutional
arguments: first, an analysis of rights and, second, an assessment
whether the right should be trumped by the interests of a free
and democratic society."
So while scholarly theory has a role to play in criticizing and
elaborating legislative promulgations, it must also have a synthe-
sizing effect in order to have an influence on the contours of
the law. It must generate a comprehensive structure for under-
standing the particular provisions of a code.s' While the syn-
thetic scholarship of triadic legal cultures generates a certain
commitment to the ideas that constitute the grammar of legal
analysis, adherence to these grammatical rules often strikes com-
mon-law lawyers as rigid and unpragmatic. I turn now to the
common source of misunderstanding between lawyers in the
common- and civil-law traditions: a misunderstanding about the
role of "systemic" thinking in the law.
III. HARD AND SOFT DISTINcTIONS
When continental lawyers, educated on a heavy dose of syn-
thetic scholarly theory, confront the pragmatic common law,
they are apt to say something like, "American law has no system"
or "American law, with its case method, is chaotic." What pre-
cisely do continental lawyers mean when they complain of the
lack of system in the common law? In fact, most distinctions and
categories developed in civilian jurisprudence have their coun-
terparts in the structure of common law.' The issue is not
whether common-law lawyers have a set of categories and dis-
tinctions for analyzing legal problems but rather how seriously
" See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Protection of Individual Rights in Canada: The Impact
of the New Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1191, 1223-26
(1984) (discussing how § 1 unifies Charter).
s See Schumann, supra note 15, at 386-406 (explaining example of individual elements
of German tripartite structure for analyzing criminal responsibility: "definition," "unlawful-
ness," and "culpability," so German lawyers can assess structural implications of all issues
bearing on criminal liability).
35 Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 454-55 (discussing analogues between Anglo-American
legal system and German law).
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common-law lawyers take their categories when they prove diffi-
cult to apply.
Consider the problem of classifying duress as either a justifica-
tion or an excuse. Lawyers influenced by the German tradition
begin their analysis by assuming that there are only two basic
reasons for recognizing a defense - either it negates the wrong-
doing of the offense (justification) or it negates the personal
culpability of the actor (excuse).' The problem with duress is
that in many cases the assertion of the defense has the effect of
negating the wrongdoing, such as, for example, when an actor
engages in a minor wrong for the sake of sparing a much great-
er interest. 7 In other cases, particularly those where the actor
commits a great wrong such as homicide for the sake of his
interests or those of his family, the assertion of duress as a de-
fense has the effect of negating the actor's personal culpabili-
ty.
38
Whether duress has primarily one effect or the other is of
great moment, for the classification of the defense determines
its systemic effects. If duress is merely an excuse rather than a
justification, then the use of force under duress is itself wrongful
and may properly be resisted by those threatened by it.9 At-
taching the systemic implications requires resolving the question
of classification. If scholars have trouble deciding one way or the
other, they cannot simply throw up their hands and create a
third category - a mixed defense, partly justification and partly
excuse. The problem is that if duress were a mixed category,
one would not know whether the person acting under duress
were using lawful or unlawful force. It would be impossible,
therefore, to determine whether the victim of the coerced use
of force could in turn use force in self-defense to thwart the
unlawful use of force.4"
' See id. at 455-56. German legal thinking structures liability and places acts such as
duress into categories. See id.; see also Thomas Morawetz, Reconstructing the Criminal Defenses:
The Significance ofJustification, 77J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 279 n.7 (1986) (discussing
clarity of German structured liability with respect to criminal defenses).
'7 See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 829-33 (explaining duress as excuse to wrongdoing).
's See id. at 831.
" See id.
o See id. at 832; see also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 949, 979-80 (1985) (stating that American common-law thinking based on reasonable-
ness leads to blurring of distinctions as opposed to German-structured liability). The prob-
758 [Vol. 31:745
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Common-law thinkers are more inclined than their civilian
counterparts to ignore such systemic implications of classifica-
tions. The common-law approach might be that first we should
decide how to classify duress and then decide what pragmatic
implications are desired from this classification. The idea that
the implications are embedded in the classification strikes com-
mon-law thinkers as logical rigidity.4' It ignores the famous
maxim of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience."42
It is surprising, then, that common-law thinkers rarely appreci-
ate the architectonic significance of moral and legal distinctions.
A good example surfaced recently in the debate about the rele-
vance of the act/omission distinction as applied to the problem
of assisted suicide.4" Without the distinction between interven-
ing in the rights of others (acts) and failing to allocate benefits
(omissions), it would be impossible to articulate a general theory
of freedom. Consider, for example, John Rawls's first principle
of justice, which accords to every citizen "the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."4
Could basic liberty in this sense include the right to be assisted
in time of emergency, say, the right to receive aid at the scene
of an accident? If it did, then this aspect of liberty would con-
flict with the freedom of passersby to carry on their own busi-
ness. We would be put in the position of having to weigh the
lem of deciding the nature of duress resembles the problem of grammatical classifications.
Gerunds like "arguing," "writing," and "judging" look like the verbs, but they function like
nouns; for example, they serve as the subject of sentences such as, "Writing is difficult."
Could we say that because gerunds look like verbs that we should create a third mixed
category lodged between the distinct poles of noun and verb? No, because the mixed cate-
gory would have no systemic implications. We would not know, for example, whether it
could satisfy the grammatical rule that every sentence must have a subject, either express
or implied. Cf Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Crimi-
nal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 311 (1996) (discussing tendency to abandon problem of
classification).
" See Fletcher, supra note 4, at 949-54 (discussing tendency of common-law thinkers to
utilize all available defenses regardless of crime alleged in pursuit of what is reasonable in
comparison to civil law, which does not rely on "reasonableness").
42 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 1 (1982).
' SeeYale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No Consti-
tutional "Right to Live"? 25 GA. L. REV. 1203, 1215-16 (1991) (suggesting concept of
act/omission distinction is necessary for moral freedom).
41 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971).
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liberty of one against the liberty of another, and we could no
longer speak of the most extensive distribution of the same
basic liberty. The freedom of which Rawls speaks does not imply
a right to be aided by the acts of others; rather, it refers solely
to the liberty from noninterference by others in the exercise of
free speech, freedom of religion, and other rights that can be
exercised without interfering with the liberty of others.
This distinction between rendering assistance and being free
from interference is fundamental to a philosophical system
based on freedom as its central value. This is precisely the dis-
tinction between omissions (not rendering aid) and actions
(interfering with the interests of others).' Therefore, so far as
one's theory of law or justice begins with a commitment to free-
dom or basic liberty in the Rawlsian sense, one must respect the
systemic difference between failing to render aid and interfering
with the interests of others.
This fundamental distinction in legal thought finds expression
as well in the doctrine of state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment. When the amendment says that "no State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,"' the active verb "deprive" implies that to vio-
late the Constitution, a state official must have actively inter-
vened in the interests of its citizens. The failure to rescue a
child in need will not, to the dismay of many, satisfy the re-
quirement of state action.47 The fact is that the entire edifice
of American constitutional law rests on the distinction between
state action and inaction - between the acts and the omissions
of the state.
Let us recognize, then, that the distinction between act and
omission lies at the foundation of our legal culture. It does not
follow, however, that the distinction is easy to apply. Returning
" The distinction sometimes gets confused with the theory of action. It is common to
argue that omissions represent the absence of action. For a critique of this view, see
George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1443,
1443 (1994).
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Kamisar, supra note 43, at 1215-16 (suggesting
concept of act/omission distinction is necessary for moral freedom).
47 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)
(holding that failure to protect minor from violent father does not violate minor's rights
under Due Process Clause).
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to the example of assisted suicide, the conventional view of a
physician's prescribing pills to enable a patient to commit sui-
cide is that the physician is acting to facilitate death. 8 Without
the intervention of the physician, the patient would not be able
to take an overdose to commit suicide. The question whether
this intervention is justified differs fundamentally from disputes
about whether the patient may refuse life-sustaining therapy. If a
terminal patient wishes to permit the onset of death, the law
clearly permits the patient to refuse further treatment 49 The
refusal is regarded as an omission that affects no one except the
patient; therefore, refusal is located squarely within the domain
of the patient's constitutionally protected autonomy.
This conventional application of the act/omission distinction
now strikes many observers as simply arbitrary. Indeed, some
lower and appellate courts have ruled that distinguishing be-
tween these two classes of patients, one who wishes to refuse
treatment and the other who wishes assistance toward commit-
ting suicide, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Skeptics balk at applying the
act/omission distinction in this context 5' With leading philoso-
phers joining him, Ronald Dworkin recently submitted a
philosopher's brief in the Supreme Court hearing on the consti-
tutionality of prohibiting assisted suicide." The brief explicitly
rejects the moral relevance of the distinction between the
patient's refusing medical care and the physician's acts facilitat-
ing death.53 The only relevant issue, Dworkin argues, is whether
the action or inaction "aim[s] at death." 4 The Supreme Court
48 See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 332-34 (discussing traditional views on prescriptions by
physicians to facilitate suicide).
" See Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (stating competent
individual may refuse medical treatment).
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
rev'd 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1995), rez/d en banc 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
" SeeJonathan R. Rosenn, The Constitutionality of Statutes Prohibiting and Permitting Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 875, 890 (1997) (arguing that act/omission distinc-
tion should be discarded in physician assisted suicide context).
" See Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' brief NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS Mar. 27, 1997, at 41.
See ida at 42.
See George P. Fletcher, Letter to the Editor, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS May 29, 1997,
at 45 (responding to Dworkin's brief).
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ruled nine to zero that the lower courts, as well as the philoso-
phers, were wrong.55
The merits of the Supreme Court case to one side, the in-
triguing question is why some people maintain faith in the ar-
chitectonic distinctions of the law, and others seem prepared to
abandon them as soon as their application becomes difficult.
Continental thinkers are more likely than common-law judges
and commentators to remain committed to the hard systemic
distinctions of the law. In the continental view, there is more at
stake than just resolving a particular problem. If a fundamental
distinction, like that between justification and excuse or between
acts and omissions, is abandoned for the sake of solving a partic-
ular borderline question, then the entire system of thought
suffers. For those who keep faith with the system, the right re-
sponse in the face of difficulty is to ponder the values expressed
in the distinction more deeply in order to figure out how they
should shape the outcome of a particular case.
Common-law lawyers are quick to abandon their categories in
the face of such hard cases. Their distinctions turn out to be
soft - willingly jettisoned in the face of uncertainty. This is part
of what common-law lawyers mean, I believe, by approaching
legal problems pragmatically or with a sense for the situation.'
Adhering too closely to traditional rules and distinctions earns
the reproof of forcing cases into the "bed of Procrustes" or
trying to fit "square pegs into round holes."57
Those who appreciate hard distinctions will be more likely to
sympathize with my thesis that legislatures should not encroach
upon the domain of these philosophical distinctions. If the dis-
tinctions are too soft, then those who use them are less likely to
sense that they represent compelling truths about the deep
structure of the law. If the claims of truth are weak, then it
5 See Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (reversing decision of en banc Ninth Circuit deci-
sion).
" See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 59-61 (1960).
Karl Llewellyn introduced the term "situation sense" as his solution to the problem of com-
mon-law judging. See id. at 60. Ironically, the term was first coined by a German scholar,
Levin Goldschmidt. See id. at 122, 127.
"7 This metaphor - fitting "a square peg into a round hole" - has been used over
300 times to describe difficult problems of legal classification. Search of WESTLAW,
ALLCASES, TP-ALL (May 3, 1998).
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seems more appropriate for legislatures to enter the field and to
bring clarity with black letter rules. One can see, then, that a
culture of soft distinctions breeds legislation and, therefore,
encourages the move from a triadic to a diadic legal culture.
CONCLUSION
This is not the place to decide whether continental fidelity to
systemic thinking is better or worse than common-law skepticism
and pragmatism. My aim for the moment is to engender greater
cross-cultural understanding of these divergent legal styles. As we
move toward a world of greater legal and cultural interdepen-
dence, we need to appreciate the differences between reliance
on hard and soft distinctions and on the related divergence
between diadic and triadic legal thinking. Comparative law can
proceed only after we first become clear about the merits of
both ways of thinking.
